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What does it really change? The impact of the 2008 financial 
crisis on the political game of the European Central Bank. 
 
Clément Fontan, Phd Student in PACTE (Center for Public Policy, Political  
Sociology and Geography) laboratory (Grenoble, France). 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims at highlighting my PhD thesis‟ subject on “The transfer of ideas and 
policy models in the EU: the case of the European Central bank” with the specific example of 
the financial crisis which started in Fall 2008
1
. The following questions are addressed: 1) How 
does the ECB‟s discourse legitimize its presence in other areas than the strict missions defined 
in the Maastricht Treaty and 2) how does the Bank try to promote its own model of structural 
reforms amongst the other actors involved in the EU debate. Two other questions highlight 
the first ones with the example of the crisis: 3) Does the crisis impact on the rhetoric of the 
ECB‟s discourse? 4) Does it undermine the authority and credibility of the Bank towards the 
other EU institutions? 
In order to answer to these questions, the paper is divided in three main parts: the first 
takes stock of the current literature analyzing the role of ideas and discourses in the ECB 
and/or the EMU‟s creation; the second analyses the ECB‟s official discourses and the impact 
of the crisis on them, the third aims at giving research perspectives to put the discourse back 
in its context. 
 
                                                 
1
 The bankrupt of Lehman Brothers the 15
th
 of September 2008 is considered as the start of the crisis 
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Introduction 
Contextualization  
Following the European Monetary Union (EMU)‟s three steps development2, domestic 
monetary competences have been transferred to a supra-national institution: the ECB. The 
Bank has been designed to be fully independent from any national or supranational political 
power
3
 and its missions are clearly defined: to keep the prices stable and to back up the EU 
policies
4
. This design has been the subject of an intense political debate, mainly about the lack 
of democratic control on the Bank. Following a rationalist point of view, the European 
integration is the outcome of a wanted and controlled delegation of competences from the 
member states to supra-national institutions. What is really at stake is thus the control‟s 
mechanisms of the States members on the new institutions. The principal-agent theory
5
 
focuses on this delegation and can be an interesting approach to question whether there is a 
democratic deficit in the ECB‟s design. The inquiry is the potential gap between the missions 
that have been delegated by the principal (here the Eurozone countries) and the way the agent 
carry them out (here the ECB). Few studies have been conducted on this problematic and they 
focus essentially on the issue of compliance towards the price stability‟s mission, the back-up 
of EU policies
6
 or on the role of the Parliament as the new principal
7
. The principal-agent 
theory has been inspired by works in the realm of economy. The delegation‟s motivations for 
the principal are based upon a reduction of the costs of management of a certain mission. The 
choice of the delegate is motivated by information‟s asymmetry and moral hazard. 
Consequently, the whole delegation‟s process is rational and can be thus rationally deducted. 
However, such crude translations of basic economic theories (that are not even academically 
checked) into the realm of politics have to be seriously put into perspective. Indeed, notions 
such as “moral hazard” dismiss one of the main assumptions of political sciences, that is to 
                                                 
2
 Cf First part of the analysis 
3
 Art. 108, ECT 
4
 Art. 104, ECT 
5
 POLLACK, Mark A. “Delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the European Community”, International 
Organization, vol. 51, 1997 
6
 ELGIE Robert. “The Politics of the European Central Bank: Principal-Agent theory and the Democratic 
Deficit”. Journal Of European Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002 
7
 TORRES Francisco « EMU and EU governance », 1
st
 EUI Alumni Conference: Governing EMU: Political, 
Economic, Legal and Historical Perspectives, October 2003 
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provide an understanding of the people action‟s thanks to the analysis of the effects of power 
upon people‟s relation. This paper claims that people‟s interactions cannot be understood 
from the rationalist method of the “costs-benefices” calculation.  
Research questions 
No studies have been conducted yet on the ECB‟s attempts to extend its field of 
competencies and its legitimacy to speak in other areas than its strict missions defined in the 
Maastricht treaty. As the ECB does not have any formal power outside the monetary sphere, 
the role of ideas and discourses is crucial to analyze, in order to understand the Bank‟s 
attempts to extend its influence. More precisely, the Bank has built an argumentation based on 
the neo-classical economic theories to legitimize its intervention in the debate concerning the 
structural reforms in the labor markets of EU countries
8
.  This paper aims thus at addressing 
the following questions : 1) How does the ECB‟s discourse legitimize its presence in other 
areas than the strict missions defined in the Maastricht Treaty and 2) how does the Bank try to 
promote its own model of structural reforms amongst other actors involved in the EU debate.  
Moreover, the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the Bank‟s discourses and 
credibility is an interesting phenomenon to observe. Indeed, the crisis challenged some of the 
neo-classical economy theories which are the bases of the Bank‟s argumentation. Two other 
questions can thus be addressed to deepen the two first ones:  3) How does the crisis impact 
on the ECB discourse? 4) Does it undermine the authority and credibility of the Bank towards 
the other EU institutions?  
Scientific relevance 
The paper‟s scientific relevance is three-folded. First, it aims at understanding how the 
Bank is reacting towards a crisis situation that is challenging its discourse coherence. 
Moreover, it consists at analyzing, through this example, the policy transfer‟s potency of the 
ECB, since, as in the European Communities Court of Justice‟s case9, there is a global lack of 
                                                 
8
 FITOUSSI J-P, « The ECB‟ monetary policy strategy and structural reforms”, European Parliament, Briefing 
paper n° 2, 30 Mai 2003 
9
 BULMER S., PADGETT S., « Policy Transfer in the European Union: An Institutionalist Perspective », British 
Journal of Political Science, 2004, No.35, p. 103-126 
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study on this institution in the policy transfer‟s field. Lastly, some researches on the EMU 
have confirmed that the Union plays a role in changing the political models and paradigms 
through a new use of certain concepts and the diffusion of new systems of collective 
representations
10
. The long-term perspective of this research is thus to investigate the role the 
Bank could play in this diffusion.  
Paper layout 
In order to answer to the four research questions, the paper is divided in three main 
parts. The first one takes stock of the current literature which is analyzing the role of ideas 
and discourses in the ECB and/or the EMU‟s creation. The main theoretical approaches and 
the methodology used in the researches are summarized critically in the aim of pointing out 
the research‟s obstacles experienced in the field.  
The second part analyses the ECB‟s official discourses. Two corpuses of texts are 
compared: the first one includes the Bank‟s monthly bulletins from January 2006 to 
December 2007; the second one consists of the same bulletins from September 2008 to 
January 2009. The methods of comparison and analysis of the corpus are presented through a 
brief introduction to the lexicometrical analysis. The main characteristics of the discourse and 
the differences between the corpuses are then summarized.  
The third part aims at giving research perspectives to complement the discourse‟s 
analysis. Indeed, one has to understand the power‟s nexus in which the institution is 
embedded to grasp the very meaning of its discourse. The agents of an institution act in 
relation to the perceived action of other agents: the formulation of a discourse is thus 
dependant of the positioning of the agents in a specific field. Consequently, a theoretical 
layout is proposed to link the notions of agent, field and discourse. Finally, three research 
hypotheses are suggested to operationalize this attempt of bringing the discourse back into its 
context by providing a theoretical layout linking the notions of ideas and politics.  
                                                 
10
 GOBIN C. Communication in the colloquium « La représentation économique de l„acteur au travail », USTL, 
20 et 23 novembre 2003, Lille, DUFRESNE A. « Le discours de la BCE concernant les aspects sociaux » in 
Purnelle G. Fairon C. et Dister A. (éds). Le poids des mots. Actes des 7e journées internationales d'analyse des 
données textuelles. Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2004. 
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The articulation between these parts can be understood with these elements: 
 It is important to prove that ideas matter and why a polity system such as the EMU is 
justified with a very technical and “rationalist-like” explanation whereas it is the 
outcome of power relations in a political game (part 1). 
 Consequently, the analysis seeks to understand what are the ideas embedded in the 
ECB‟s discourse (part 2). It is often argued that two different categories of works fit 
the heading “discursive approaches”: either they consider discourse as a theory of 
European integration or not
11
. The study of the ECB‟s discourse aims both at 
providing a part of a structure of meaning (what is acceptable to say in a given 
political area) and indicators to investigate agents‟ behavior12.  
 The relationship between actors and discourses is thus complicated. It is argued in this 
paper that these two notions are contingent. On the one hand, words are politics; they 
are acts that change reality and not only comment on it
13
. On the other hand, discourse 
does not stand apart from the reality of power struggles in a given area (part3), its 
meaning is thus influenced by politics of the field. In order to understand the structure 
of the field in which ideas and discourses are embedded, the part 3 focuses on a 
methodology centered on agents and elites. The hypotheses developed in this part are 
only concerning this problematic and not the interaction between actors and 
discourses. Part 2 and 3 constitute thus each other and have both to be taken seriously 
in order to understand how ideas (and more specifically polity-ideas) transfer.  
I) The role of ideas and discourses in the EMU’s and ECB’s 
creation. 
Many political sciences‟ researches have analyzed the creation of the EMU with an 
extended variety of approaches: the classic International Relations‟ theories such as realism or 
regime theory; the first European Studies‟ approaches such as the inter-governmentalism or 
                                                 
11
 WOEVER Ole, “Discursive Approaches”,  Book Chapter from Wiener Antje and Diez Thomas, European 
Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, 2004 
12
 Ibid, p.199 
13
 Ibid, p.212 
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the neo-functionalism; the different schools of neo-institutionalism
14
. However, it is Kathleen 
McNamara in her seminal book
15
, who clearly defines the most important factors explaining 
the unlikely creation of the EMU. She first analyzes the economic theories that influenced the 
EMU design
16
 and concludes that there was no obvious scientific reason which could justify 
the chosen configuration. The analysis of the rational economic theories help to understand 
the reasons invoked by the experts and the political leaders in the decision-making process but 
not the particular choice they made. The role of the ideas in the choices of the decision-
makers is thus relevant to observe, since uncertainty is very high in the monetary sphere and 
there is no real consensus on what should be a “good” macro-economic decision. The key-
moment on the road to EMU was the ideational consensus towards the goals and the 
instruments of the monetary policy, at the end of the European monetary system in 1979. The 
success of this experience led to a convergence amongst the States‟ elites on the importance 
of “sound money”, in other words, price stability. Even more important, in a recent article she 
assesses that “the consensus on the virtues of monetary stability among a relatively narrow set 
of technocratic policy elites has endured, has became institutionalized in the ECB and is 
providing a foundation for the operation of EMU
17”. Therefore, material and rational 
explanations cannot explain the actual design of EMU and its institutionalization in the ECB, 
the shift in the policy makers‟ minds should be considered as socially or ideologically 
constructed.  
There is still a need of clarification for the specific role that ideas play. More precisely, 
the role of politics and its relation to the ideational explanation has to be investigated. This 
link is an uneasy theoretical question that researchers try to solve by considering the nature of 
ideas. Most of the researchers agree on the fact that there is a discrepancy between strategic 
and cognitive ideas. The former is close to the role of ideas in the rational choice‟s approach 
                                                 
14
 For an account of these approaches, see HOWART D. et LOEDEL P. The European Central Bank, The new 
European Leviathan , Palgrave MacMillan, 2005 
15
 MCNAMARA K. The currency of ideas : monetary politics in the European Union, Cornell University Press, 
1998 
16
 The Mundell-Felming triangle was the theoretical basis of the EMU. It explains that between the three 
following economic situations, only two can be applied at the same time : Fixed change rates, autonomy of the 
monetary policy,  freedom of the capital‟s moves. The EMU implies that there is no autonomy of the monetary 
policy, however other configurations were as coherent as this one.  
17
 MCNAMARA K, “Economic Governance, Ideas, and EMU:  What Currency Does Policy Consensus Have 
Today?” Special Issue of Journal of Common Market Studies, “The Theory and Practice of Economic 
Governance in EMU Revisited”, Vol. 44, Num. 4, November 2006. p.804 
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as in Shepsle: they are considered as strategic weapons or “hooks” on which actors puts their 
objectives and interests
18. It is also similar to the notion of “second-order belief” developed by 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
19
. The latter consider that ideas play a more passive and structural 
role. Ideas are embodied in agents, they framed their visions of the world and its problems, 
and they are deeply rooted and implemented throughout the agent‟s life‟s time: in other 
words, it is part of the “deep-core” of belief system20. Finally this consideration about the 
Janus-faced nature of ideas is summarized by McNamara : “[The ] actors are strategic and 
self-interested, but as humans, they cannot escape the process of interpreting and giving 
meaning to their environment and this is the process of ideational creation and diffusion that 
interests me
21”. 
The distinction made here on the nature of ideas is crucial since it explains the different 
views in the literature on the role that ideational factors played in the EMU and ECB‟s 
creation. A first group of authors insist on the interpretative role that ideas are playing in the 
world‟s perception of the agents; it is close to the notion of problem-framing in the public 
policy field. The agents have thus a common actions‟ grammar, what they do is 
understandable according to the perceived field of possibility of action. In Vivian Schmidt‟s 
works on the notion of discursive institutionalism
22
, discourses can explain change since they 
help the agents to interpret the world differently. Mark Blyth argues in the same way when he 
considers that “ideas matter because they can actually alter people‟s conception of their own 
self-interest
23”. It is even more relevant for the EMU creation since economic agents are often 
unsure of what are really their interests. In this context, ideas provide a scientific and 
normative account to a specific, socially-built solution (such as money stability). Parsons
24
 
goes even further when he claims that ideas are a powerful causal explanation since it is not 
                                                 
18
 Quoted in PEDERSEN L.H. « Ideas are transformed as they transfer : a comparative study of eco-taxation in 
Scandinavia », Journal of European Public Policy, vol 14 (1), 2007 
19
 SABATIER P. et JENKINS-SMITH H.C (eds). Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition 
Approach. Boulder, 1993 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 MCNAMARA K, “Economic Governance, Ideas, and EMU:  What Currency Does Policy Consensus Have 
Today?” p.812 
22
 SCHMIDT V.A. « The explanatory power of ideas and discourse », Annual review of political sciences, Vol 
11, 2008 
23
 BLYTH Mark, Great transformations, economic ideas and institutional change in the twentieth century. 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, preface 
24
 PARSONS Craig, How to map arguments in political sciences, Oxford university press, 2007 
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the agents‟ position that explains its action but the perception that the agent has of its own 
position. This perception is heavily influenced by the set of ideas that frame the agent‟s vision 
of the world. 
A second group of authors consider that ideas are important since they help to build 
actors‟ coalition and help them to agree on a set of objectives and ways of acting for a specific 
problem. McNamara‟s works are part of this group and Amy Verdun‟s study on the role of 
epistemic communities
25
 in EMU‟s building is completing her studies. Nicolas Jabko is the 
one who is trying to link the role of ideas and politics in the EMU‟s design in the most 
systematic way
26
. He considers that market ideas have been used by strategic actors since they 
did not have enough power resources. The Commission built a wide coalition including actors 
with very diverse opinions since market ideas have been used to legitimize the EMU in such a 
flexible way that everybody could find something on which she agrees on. 
Finally, diverse opinions exist on the specific role that ideas have played in the EMU‟s, 
and consequently, ECB‟s creation, according to the vision that each author has on the nature 
of ideas. I argue that these works are very convincing to prove that ideas matter but there is 
still a theoretical lack in defining how and why ideas and politics are contingent and constitute 
each other. Indeed, McNamara and Jabko insist on the specific role that neo-classical 
economic theories played in building up wide coalitions of actors but they do not provide an 
ideational factor to explain why such strategic ideas have been chosen more than others. This 
paper proposes to analyze the field‟s structure in which ideas are embedded, not only from a 
political point of view but with a regard to the ideological preferences of the actors who 
matter. It is both the micro-politics of a given field and the macro “regime of truth” that have 
to be taken into account to understand the link between ideas and politics.  
 I argue that the first research step is to detect which ideas are embodied in each actor‟s 
discourse and to unveil the attempts of political legitimization that are often hidden between 
the lines of technical discourse. I suggest thus to do a lexicometrical analysis on the ECB‟s 
                                                 
25
 VERDUN A. « The role of the Delors Committee in the creation of EMU : an epistemic community? »,  
European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No 98/44, 1998 
26
 JABKO Nicolas, Playing the market, a political strategy for uniting Europe, 1985-2005, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 2006 
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discourse corpus to reveal its argumentation‟s structure. This paper focuses more specifically 
on the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the Bank‟s discourse and the changes it may have 
provoked in its structure and rhetoric. The second research step is then to comprehend the 
Bank‟s position in the EU field in order to put the discourse back into its context.  
II) Does the crisis really matter? An analysis of the ECB’s 
discourse 
This section analyzes the ECB‟s official discourse through a lexicometrical analysis. The 
first part aims at explaining the methodology of corpus‟ selection and quantitative textual 
analysis method; the second part focuses on the main characteristics of the ECB discourse and 
the third part investigates the impact of the crisis on the ECB‟s discourse.   
Methodology 
The corpus of texts is constituted with a selection of official ECB‟s monthly bulletins. 
Since 1999, the Bank is publishing every month a bulletin summarizing both its monetary and 
economic analyses and decisions, its layout did not change since its first edition. The parts of 
the bulletins that are included in the corpus are: 
 The introduction: it is the basis of the ECB‟s monthly press conference which is its 
main communication targeting a broad public. It summarizes the Bank‟s principal 
arguments on money stability and the economic reforms that should be implemented 
to achieve this goal. 
 The section 3 (“Prices and costs). It is a global analysis of the variables that could 
stimulate inflation. Amongst these ones are the wages‟ levels and the influence of the 
social and economic models. It develops thus the rhetorical link between price stability 
and structural reforms. 
 The section 4.2. (“Labour market). In this section, the Bank analyses the mechanisms 
of wages‟ fixations and discuss the structural reforms that are considered as necessary 
in order to keep a low inflation. 
 The section 4.3 (“The outlook for economic activity”). The analysis of the future 
economic development in the Eurosystem emphases the risks existing on the monetary 
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stability. The Bank then lists the decisions in the economic sphere, regarding the 
monetary stability, which should be taken by the Euro countries.  
 The section 5 (“Fiscal developments) 
Two periods of times are included in the corpus: the first one takes place from January 
2006 to December 2007, the second one integrates the bulletins from September 2008 to 
January 2009. The global length of the corpuses (209 899 and 47 954 words) is sufficient to 
compare them and to do a quantitative lexical analysis. As this analysis is partly taken from 
my PhD thesis researches, the language of the corpus is in French (the original monthly 
bulletins are officially translated by the French National Bank). 
The aim of the analysis is to demonstrate how the ECB is extending its sphere of influence 
from the monetary sphere. The selection is then justified by the systematic inclusion of all the 
Bank‟s developments when not related to strict monetary issues and decisions. Other 
quantitative studies exist on the ECB‟s unofficial discourses27. It is interesting to notice that 
the main conclusions of both of the works (neutralization of political and social aspects of 
economic policies, importance of structural reforms), as well as the structure of the discourse, 
are similar. It already reveals a main characteristic of the ECB discourse: its stability and 
homogeneity.  
The corpus is then “normalized” in the aim of preparing it for the lexicometrical analysis. 
Such normalization techniques include
28
 : Markers (temporal tags are included before each 
bulletins), orthographic corrections, delimitations for each sentences. Next, the corpus is 
“lemmatized”. It means that each word of the corpus is linked to a dictionary‟s entry. Verbs, 
words and adjectives are separated to provide a precise analysis. 
Main characteristics of the ECB discourse 
First, the focus is put on the number of occurrences in the ECB discourse. The most 
present substantives identify the two dominant themes of the ECB discourse: “price” and 
                                                 
27
 BARBAS J. « La communication de la Banque Centrale Européenne, entre technicité économique et impératif 
de justification », Terrains et travaux, Vol 8(1), 2005 
28
 For a more extended account of this methodology, LABBE D. « Normes de saisie et de dépouillement des 
textes politiques », Cahier du CERAT, Grenoble, 1990 
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“growth”. This is confirmed by the analysis of the syntagmes (most frequent words‟ 
combinations): “Euro zone”, “Labour market” and “price stability” reach the top three 
positions. Other characteristics revealed by this first analysis are: 
 The first position in the verbs‟ list of “should”. It is not used in the context of the 
moral obligation but it expresses a probability or a mark of prudency.  
 The impersonality of the discourse. It is characterized by an over-utilization of the 
reflexive verbal form.  
 The amount of negotiation forms. 
 The weight of the demonstrative form, sign of a pedagogic tone.  
The syntagme‟s analysis shows that when the ECB is considering other themes that 
monetary ones, it focuses essentially on the labour market. This is put forward with an 
analysis of the meaning of the words.  
There are two methods of calculation measuring the meaning of words
29
: the analysis of 
the “universes” of the tokens (what are the other tokens which are over- or under-used in the 
surroundings of the studied token in comparison with the normal distribution in the rest of the 
corpus) and the most representative sentences (the sentences where the studied token is 
surrounded by the most over-used tokens of its universe). The latter is a kind of mathematic 
form of the quotation used to highlight an actors‟ discourse.  
The universes of “price”, “growth” and “unemployment” are first studied in order to show 
how these three key economic notions are articulated in the ECB‟s discourse. The Bank 
adopts a three steps reasoning: 1) The monetary policy has to be stable in order to help the 
financial agents to do better anticipations and then trust the reliability of the Bank, 2) This 
trust triggers an optimal resources‟ allocation on different markets which create the conditions 
for a sustainable growth, 3) This sustainable growth is the only possibility to achieve a full 
employment. It is obvious here that this reasoning is heavily influenced by the neo-classical 
theories, notably the importance of “sound money” notion and the impossibility to act on any 
market but to provide the optimal fluctuation‟s conditions for the balance of the offer and 
                                                 
29
 LABBE C. et LABBE D. « How to measure the meanings of words ? Amour in Corneille's work », Language 
Resources Evaluation, Vol 39, 2005, pp 335-351. 
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demand
30
. This reasoning is characterized by two main points: 1) the importance of time since 
the sequential order of economic links put the objective of employment in the last position, 2) 
the complete lack of debate on the relevance of these links: the neo-classical theories are 
dominant in the economic field but are still under a intense academic debate which is never 
mentioned in the ECB discourse, offering thus no other alternative thinking.  This analysis is 
confirmed by a scrutinizing of the universes of the three tokens.  
The sentences in which the token “price” is included are longer that average sentences 
which means that they are under more attention and more thought about. They contain 
however fewer numbers than in usual sentences, showing a lack of quantity and time 
indicators. Universes of “employment” and “growth” are characterized by an under-
representation of action verbs and a strong presence of the syntagme “structural reforms” and 
the lexical universes of “flexibility” and “sustainability”. The notions of sustainability and 
flexibility seem thus to be two mechanisms of the “rise in generalities” that the ECB uses in 
order to legitimate its discourse outside the monetary sphere. 
Here, sustainability is referred to public finances (73% of the token is linked to the 
syntagme “public finances”). As the European population is ageing, the Bank estimates that 
the lack of sustainability of public finances could be a risk for the stability of the prices. It 
thus proposes a vast list of possible reforms of the pension systems and stresses the urgency 
of their implementation. It is interesting to notice that there is an obvious gap between the link 
demographic changes-price stability (even the Bank states that this link is unsure), and the 
great accuracy of list of proposed reforms.  
“Flexibility” is strongly linked to the syntagme “labour market”. The Bank calls very 
repetitively for a greater flexibility on labour markets: the most representative sentence for 
“flexibility” is “copied and pasted” through all the bulletins, whatever the circumstances. 
Indeed, according to the Bank, the unemployment‟s causes are also linked to wages‟ fixation 
that is not enough flexible on many European labour markets. In order to keep the inflation 
stable, the ECB asks thus the social partners to “continue to meet their responsibilities” which 
means that any ask for wage‟s augmentation is a risk for the global EU employment‟s rate. In 
                                                 
30
 BEAUD M. et DOSTALER M. La pensée économique depuis Keynes, Editions du Seuil, 1996, p176 
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May 2007, a slight change occurred in the ECB‟s argumentation: it stated that wages‟ rise is a 
risk for the “purchasing power” of all the Eurozone citizens. The purchasing power was one 
of the main themes in the electoral campaign of the French President N.Sarkozy which was at 
its peak at this precise time. The theory of the plot is not proposed here, the interpretation of 
this fact is that there was an opportunity for the Bank to add an argument, which had at that 
time a great political salience, to its rhetoric in favor of stable wages.   
Finally, three main remarks can be made: 1) the ECB is often referring to a macro-
economic reasoning when its discourse is focused on economic facts outside the monetary 
sphere. It is a crucial point since neo-classical theories are based on a micro-economic 
reasoning. 2) The blurry links between the notions of price stability, ageing population and 
labour market‟s flexibility are contrasting with the precision of the structural reforms 
proposed for these areas. 3) The Bank‟s discourse kept on being very stable for the whole 
period between January 2006 and December 2007, despite all the variations that happened in 
European economies (such as the 2007 food prices‟ crisis). The conclusion of the analysis is 
that the ECB discourse (when not strictly related to monetary analysis) is more dogmatic than 
analytical and presents many of the features of a political discourse.  
The crisis that occurred in September 2008 on the financial markets and which seems to 
trigger the worst global recession since the 30‟, has, according to certain commentators, 
undermined the theoretical foundations of the neo-classical paradigms that were the basis for 
many of the economic mechanisms and perceptions. It is thus pertinent to observe the impact 
that this event could have on the structure and the rhetoric of the ECB political discourse. 
The impact of the 2008 financial crisis 
The aim of this section is to compare the two corpuses of monthly bulletins in order to 
detect the changes that might occur following the crisis. The distance between the two 
corpuses is measured by the number of different tokens they contain
31
. The inter-textual 
distance‟s analysis shows that between 70 and 80% of the used tokens are in common 
between the two corpuses. It means that there are no changes of the writers and/or the themes 
                                                 
31
 See LABBE Cyril and LABBE Dominique "Inter-Textual Distance and Authorship Attribution Corneille and 
Molière". Journal of Quantitative Linguistics. No.8, Vol. 3, p. 213-231. 2001 
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approached. This apparent similarity is then verified by another method which analyses the 
stylistic breaks on a segmented time-scale
32. In the following graph, the variable “vocabulary 
growth” (Vk: number of new tokens that appeared from the beginning of the text to the n 
time) is centered on the values of the tendency calculated thanks to the model of “vocabulary 
fragmentation” (V‟k). It is then divided by the standard deviation at the n time. The values of 
V‟k form the horizontal axis of the graph. A corridor of “normal fluctuation” is symbolized 
by the dashed lines (± 1,96 standard deviation.). The points that are not between these dashed 
lines are thus considered as an irregularity in vocabulary‟s growth or decline.  
Table 1: Vocabulary’s growth in the monthly bulletins editorials since January 2006 
(slides of 500 tokens) 
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Two main conclusions can be noticed here: First, there is a global tendency to the 
rarefaction of new words. It means that the ECB is not developing new themes and is globally 
focused on the same topics. Second, a notable peak of new words is reached in September 
2008 but this one is followed by a phenomenon of stagnation and recession since the Bank 
used again the “copy-paste” method in the two next bulletins. It is surprising that the ECB did 
                                                 
32
 See LABBE Cyril, LABBE Dominique and Hubert Pierre, "Automatic Segmentation of Texts and Corpora". 
Journal of Quantitative Linguistics., No.11, Vol.3. p. 193-213, December 2004 
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not adapt at all its discourse to the worst crisis that happened since the 30‟s (the majority of 
the points is between the “normal” corridor of the dashed lines). However, another hypothesis 
can be formulated: did the ECB conserved the same style and vocabulary in its discourse but 
adapted it by focusing on some themes more than others?  
 Some changes in the vocabulary and grammatical structure, as well as in the repeated 
syntagms, are observed. First, some of the syntagms are relatively more used in the second 
corpus than in the first one. These ones include: “price stability” (+48%), “economic activity” 
(+45%), “middle term” (+31%). On the contrary, there is a sharp decline for some other ones: 
“GNP growth” (-76%), “public finances” (-57%) and long term (-44%). The list of the most 
repeated tokens show important variations as well: the proper names such as countries names 
(-19%) and the numbers including dates and statistics (-12%). Finally, the extent of the 
vocabulary used is smaller than in the first corpus and the “copy-paste” style is even more 
present. 
 Several important inferences can be made from this analysis. First, the notion of time 
is changing in the ECB‟s analysis. Facing the current turmoil and uncertainty of the markets, 
the Bank is less and less able to do long term projections. It is thus logical that the objectives 
(GNP growth, public finances) that were following the price stability in the neo-classical 
reasoning are less and less considered in the discourse. The global coherence of economic 
links that would lead in the long term to full employment in the ECB discourse is hindered by 
the current uncertainty and inability of the markets to answer by themselves to their current 
flaws. Moreover, the bulletins are becoming more abstract (or theoretical) since they are less 
taking in consideration concrete facts (countries‟ analysis, numbers). Two main conclusions 
of the impact of the crisis on the Bank‟s discourse are thus presented: 
 There is no real lexical or thematic break or shift that has been observed in the 
discourse since the crisis occurs. As the hypothesis of the stability of the discourse has 
not been analyzed per se, it is more correct to say that no important variations have 
occurred since 2006 even if few but significant changes are observed since the last 
months. 
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  In his analysis of the 1929 crisis, J-K Galbraith noticed that even if this kind of events 
is predicable, they always surprise the actors involved
33
. As this study was on the five 
first months of the crisis (the starting point considered here is the bankrupt of Lehman 
Brothers, The 15
th
 of September 2008), it is possible that the Bank did not integrate 
yet the outcomes of the turn provoked in fall 2008. However, this conclusion might be 
hindered by the fact that stereotypes are protective from this kind of turn. The ECB‟s 
governing Council seems to have found all the arguments needed in its former rhetoric 
to justify a real change in its monetary policy (important decrease of the interest rates). 
The discourse stays basically the same except that the Bank puts more emphasis on the 
urgency of implementing structural reforms
34
: it can be inferred from this fact that, 
facing the crisis, the ECB is becoming more dogmatic in its discourse. 
From this discursive analysis, this study seeks to investigate the bank‟s credibility and its 
influence amongst its other EU partners. Is this discourse‟s stability a defensive tactic because 
the Bank‟s arguments are now under-minded in the EU scene? Is this stability an offensive 
tactic by which the Bank interprets the actual turn to insist on the urgency of implanting the 
structural reforms it proposes? It is obvious here, that discourse‟s analysis does not provide all 
the explanations for explaining the Bank‟s actions. At best, it gives clues for investigation of 
actor‟s game and of the tactics that it might use. However, it does not help to understand the 
very meaning of the words used in the discourse and the influence it might have on other 
actors. In order to study the reception of the ECB discourse, one has thus to understand the 
power‟s relations in which the Bank is evolving with the other actors of the studied field, and 
then to develop a methodology to be able to measure the influence of the ideas. 
 
III) Bringing the discourse back into its context  
                                                 
33 GALBRAITH John K. (1954). La crise économique de 1929. Anatomie d'une crise financière, Payot, 1970  
 
34 In the editorial of the monthly bulletin of December 2008, the Bank states that the actual situation should be 
considered as a catalyst to push forward the necessary structural reforms. 
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In this section, theoretical and methodological considerations are developed to provide a 
coherent research design aiming at giving sense to the ECB‟s discourse and measuring its 
influence. It is argued that the understanding of the micro-interactions between the ECB and 
EU officials and the structure of the field in which they evolve permit to link the notions of 
ideas and politics.  However, no field research has been conducted yet to check the accuracy 
of the research design. From this point, the paper should be considered as a “work in 
progress”, all the remarks and commentaries are particularly welcome to improve the 
proposed hypotheses.  
How to link the notions of actors and field? 
First, the emphasis is put on the importance of developing a relational mode of 
analysis. Indeed, one cannot understand the action of an agent without positioning it towards 
the other agents evolving in the same field. It is obvious that a discourse does not have the 
same meaning and the same influence since actors do not have the same place in the decision-
making process. It will not be of the same importance (in the meaning or in the extent) 
whether the ECB states it is important to have a greater wages‟ flexibility on the labour 
market or if the German chancellor tells exactly the same thing. It is thus necessary to 
investigate the relation between the action of an agent and the structure of the field where it 
evolves: Is there a causal relation between the two concepts? What are the variables that could 
explain this causality? 
In order to answer this question, the notions of “habitus” and “field” developed by 
Pierre Bourdieu
35
 are revisited and used in the analysis. The usual definition of field is “a 
network of objective relations in constant interaction to dominate a given subject
36”. 
However, the notion of domination does not fit so well with our object of inquiry: as the Bank 
does not have any formal power in the studied field of the EU negotiations around structural 
reforms, it is more accurate to talk about influence. The operating definition of field proposed 
is thus: a network of objective relations in which the agents try to build themselves a 
                                                 
35
 The notions developed by Pierre Bourdieu have recently influenced many researches in the European Studies 
field. For an account of these ones, see SAURUGGER Sabine (dir), “Les approches sociologiques de 
l‟intégration européenne, Perspectives critiques”, Politique Européenne, No.25, Spring 2008  
36
 DEZALAY Yves et MADSEN  Mikael Rask, « The power of the legal field, Pierre Bourdieu and the law » in 
Banakar Reza et Travers Max (ed) An introduction to Law and Social Theory, Oxford University Press 2002 
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legitimacy to influence on a given subject. There is no causal relation between a field and the 
actions of agents in this one, they are contingent: the field structures the actions and is 
structured by them. The actors are heavily influenced by their habitus which is “the 
internalized scheme guiding the agents‟ behavior, a practical sense – or socially founded 
sense of the game – which is constructed throughout the agent‟s particular and individual 
trajectory
37”. It is then the encounter of this sense of the game and the particular structure of a 
field which can explain the actions of an agent. The habitus is thus “a structured structure 
predisposed to structure a specific field
38”. As Parsons says39, there are no automatic 
mechanisms guiding the actions of agents: they are conducted by the subjective perception 
they have of the objective range of possibility in the field.  
This theoretical background asks thus to investigate not only the Bank as an institution 
but the particular sociological features of the individuals it is composed of
40
. As the inquiry of 
this paper is to look for the influence of ECB‟s ideas on the other EU institutions, it is not so 
much the decision-making process inside the Bank that will be the subject of our attention but 
more the interactions of its agents with the outside actors: it is thus a sociological study of the 
interfaces of the institution. Indeed, with regard to the EU macro-economic dialog and the 
terms of the Maastricht treaty
41
, the Bank is in constant interaction with other EU institutions 
as shown in the following scheme: 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 MADSEN Mickael Rask, “From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The European Court of 
Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics”, Law & Social Inquiry, Vol.32, 
No.1, 137–159, Hiver 2007 
38
 BOURDIEU Pierre, Le sens pratique, Editions de Minuit, 1980, p.89 
39
 PARSONS Craig, How to map arguments in political sciences 
40
 This is an answer to the call of  MCNAMARA K in “Economic Governance, Ideas, and EMU:  What 
Currency Does Policy Consensus Have Today?”  when she states that “a systematic sociological study of the 
ECB professional staff would be helpful to determine whether consensus is being reinforced by the new 
bureaucratization of the monetary policy realm and the creation of a professional socialization within the 
ranks”p.813 
41
 Art 113, ECT 
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Table 2: The interactions of the ECB with other EU institutions. 
 
Source : DUFRESNE Anne, Analyse du discours de la BCE : aspect sociaux, le vieillissement de la population : 
l‟argument pour la privatisation et l‟individualisation des retraites, Mimeo, novembre 2001, Translated by the 
author. 
The proposed methodology for investigating the interfaces of the Bank is two-folded. 
1) In her PhD thesis on the networks of the staff of the European Commission
42
, Semin 
Suvarierol develops a multivariate analysis combining direct participant observation and 
questionnaires with both open and close ended questions. This method helps her to distinguish 
between leisure and official networks: the role of nationality to establish contacts is 
differentiated in both of them. The mapping out of the networks of the ECB‟s officials might 
be enhanced by these methods but they do not take into consideration the structuring power of 
the field they are embedded in. 2) In order to do so, Dezalay and Madsen
43
 propose to 
                                                 
42
 SUVARIEROL Semin, Beyond the Myth of  Nationality, A Study on the Networks of European Commission 
Officials, Eburon Academic Publishers, 2007 
43
 DEZALAY Yves et MADSEN  Mikael Rask, « La construction Européenne au carrefour du national et de 
l‟international » in Cohen Antonin, Lacroix Bernard et Riutort Phillipe (dir), Les formes de l’activité politique, 
PUF 2006 
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elaborate relational biographies in which individual trajectories are collected and analyzed 
through a collective biography of a field of practices (what are the agent‟s practices that are 
considered as acceptable in a certain field?).  Once that the context in which the actors are 
evolving is understood, the analysis can move to the problem of measuring the influence of 
ideas. 
How to measure the influence of ideas? 
 The research conducted on the ideas carried by the ECB‟s discourse and the context in 
which the Bank‟s staff is evolving does not help yet to understand the specific conditions of 
the potentiality of a transfer of ideas. Indeed, members of an institution can have a specific 
idea on the way to enhance a political model and be in interaction with the decision-makers 
but their influence on them can still be very limited. The question of measuring the influence 
of an idea is problematic since it is very hard to distinguish its effects from other variables. 
The aim of this paper is not to show that ECB‟s set of ideas on structural reforms is the 
explanatory variable of the changes that might occur in this area, but one of the variables. As 
the Bank is an actor that should not be involved in this debate, it is already scientifically 
relevant to show any influence even if it is hard to separate it from other factors: in other 
words, there is no attempt to measure mathematically the influence of the Bank‟s ideas. To do 
so, I propose three main hypotheses that have to be tested on the research‟s field, with the 
methods developed in the previous section. 
Hypothesis 1: Social features of the ECB‟s staff are close to the ones of other EU institution‟s 
personnel. The methods to test this hypothesis are influenced by the researches conducted in 
the sociology of elites‟ field. In his seminal work44, Putnam listed four main areas of elites‟ 
studies: 
 The social origins of the elites. Which echelon of the society does the ECB‟s staff 
come from? Even if this process has become less deterministic, it is still the upper 
classes of the society that are providing the main cohorts of the people attaining 
                                                 
44
 PUTNAM R.D., The comparative study of political elites, Prentice Halls, 1976 
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elite‟s positions. A more precise analysis should provide the main regularities of 
these origins: it could be then compared to the ones of other EU staff. 
 The career‟s evolutions of the elites. What are the necessary skills and attributes to be 
recruited in the ECB? It is supposed that high qualification is needed in economic 
and/or monetary issues. An experience in national banking seems to be a prerequisite 
to attain the highest positions in the Bank‟s organization chart. However, other 
conditions are less known. What is the most looked after between a specialist and a 
generalist profile? Are certain academic backgrounds, such as the Bruges European 
College, preferred? 
 The study of values, activities and attitudes of the elites. Does the supranational 
context, in which the Bank‟s personnel is evolving, lead to a shift of values? To what 
extent the distance from the traditional domestic background can form a new “type” 
of elites? The literature is divided on this question, some works show a values‟ shift45 
when other explain that this change is an outcome of national strategy
46
or that the 
socialization logics inside the EU are still following domestic patterns
47
. The relevant 
question to our study would be whether the great influence of the former German 
Bundesbank on the ECB‟s organizational mode, missions and implementation has an 
impact on its staff.     
 The study of the interaction of the elites between them. This issue has already been 
developed in the section on the link between field and agents. 
Hypothesis 2: The closeness of these social characteristics helps the agents to trust each other 
more easily. Indeed, there is a human tendency to homophily: contacts between similar people 
occur more often than in case of difference, even more notably in informal networks. This 
concept has its roots in the experimental literature in social psychology
48
.Consequently, as 
                                                 
45
 ROSENAU James et all, On the cutting edge of globalization, Rowmann and littlefield publishers, 2006 
46
 DEZALAY Yves, « Les courtiers de l‟international, Héritiers cosmopolites, mercenaires de l‟impérialisme et 
missionnaires de l‟universel », Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, Num.151-152, 2004 
47 CHECKEL Jeffrey, « International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework », 
International organization, No.59, pp. 801-826,Fall 2005 
48 MCPHERSON M., et all, “Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks”, Annual Review of Sociology, 
No.27, pp. 415-444,  2001, MCGUIRE W.J., « The nature of attitudes and attitude change » in Gardner et 
Aronson, The Handbook of social psychology, Reading, 1968, EVANS F.B., “Selling as a dyadic relationship-A 
new approach” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 6, May 1963 
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staff members are “similar” and share the same beliefs, the Bank‟s representatives are more 
able to transfer their ideas to their partners they are interacting with.  
Hypothesis 3: The positioning of the agents on a specific field both influence and is 
influenced by the transfer of ideas. Collective biographies methods are developed to test this 
hypothesis. 
To conclude, it could be interesting to focus on some key moments, when situations of 
changes occur, to test these hypotheses. The case of the 2008 crisis is thus very relevant to 
study. This paper has analyzed the slight reconfiguration of the Bank‟s discourse following 
the crisis. Studies of the same type should be conducted on other EU institutions to detect 
whether they still follow their former rhetoric after the crisis or if this one has provoked a 
radical change. Researches of this kind can be very precise into dating the moments of 
discourse‟s change; this could help to answer to the question: who is influencing who? The 
question of the reception of the discourse has still to be taken in consideration; the 
multiplication of researches on the transfer of ideas could greatly improve this “ECB-
focused” work by building up a global two-dimension “mapping” of the transfer of ideas 
between EU institutions.  
This paper proposes to take into account works that have already been done on the 
comparative study of the discourses on Europe at a national level
49
 which show the 
importance of “polity-ideas”, i.e. normative ideas about a political order. This type of study 
could be done on EU institutions that are too often considered as apolitical and of a single 
administrative importance: this idea-marker‟s study would constitute the first dimension of 
the map. The second map‟s dimension would represent the individual networks (both formal 
and informal) that link the staff of the EU institution. The combination of these two 
dimensions could show both ideas embedded in actors‟ discourse and the context in which 
they are evolving that give sense to their words. Finally, an overview of this map would help 
to link the micro-politics of the studied field and the global regime of truth which structure 
them and that is structured back.  
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